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Private Pensions and Income Security in Old Age: 
An Uncertain Future—Conference Report 
 
Martin Hering and Michael Kpessa (McMaster University) 
 
 
Abstract:  By all measures the private pension system in Canada is in difficulty. One 
estimate suggests that at the end of 2005 there were significant funding shortfalls in about 
three quarters of the traditional defined benefit pension plans that fall under federal 
jurisdiction in Canada. In order to discuss how vulnerable the current  system is, to identify 
possible directions of reform, and to consider how to implement them, the conference on 
“Private Pensions and Income Security in Old Age: An Uncertain Future” brought together 
researchers, those who design and manage pension plans, and those responsible for pension 
policy, both from Canada and abroad. It was organized by the SEDAP Research Program 
and held in Hamilton, Ontario, in November 2006. This paper summarizes the 
presentations that were given in 10 conference sessions, covering issues such as pension 
regulations, poverty and income security in old age, policy options, reform obstacles, and 
international perspectives. Many of the conference presentations, including tables and 
graphs, are available on SEDAP’s website: 
http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/sedap/ConfPresNov2006.htm 
 
Keywords: private pensions, public pensions, income security in old age, poverty in old 
age, defined-benefit pension plans, pension plan funding, pension plan coverage  
 
JEL Classifications: G23, G28, G38, H55, I38, J14, J32, J26 
 
Résumé: Tous les indicateurs montrent que le régime de retraite privé au Canada est en 
difficulté. Une évaluation suggère qu’à la fin de 2005, environ les trois quarts des régimes 
de retraite à prestations déterminées qui dépendent de la juridiction fédérale du Canada 
souffrent d’un manque à gagner important. Afin de discuter de la vulnérabilité du système 
actuellement en place, d’identifier les orientations de réformes potentielles, et de considérer 
leurs implémentations possibles, la conférence sur « les régimes de retraites privées et la 
sécurité du revenu des aînés : Un futur incertain » a rassemblé des chercheurs, les 
personnes qui conçoivent et gèrent les régimes de retraite ainsi que des responsables de la 
politique des pensions au Canada et à l'étranger. Cette dernière a été organisée par le 
programme de recherche SEDAP et s’est tenu à Hamilton, Ontario, en novembre 2006. Cet 
article offre un résumé des présentations qui ont été données durant les 10 sessions de la 
conférence, abordant des questions incluant les réglementations des systèmes de pension, la 
pauvreté et la sécurité du revenu des aînés, les options stratégiques potentielles, les 
obstacles de réforme, et les perspectives internationales. Plusieurs communications, y 




   2
SEDAP Research Program 
Program for Research on Social and Economic Dimensions of an Aging Population 
 
 
Private Pensions and Income Security in Old Age:  
An Uncertain Future 
 
 
November 15-17, 2006 
Tanenbaum Pavilion, Art Gallery of Hamilton 
Hamilton, Ontario  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
By all measures our private pension system is in difficulty. One estimate suggests 
that at the end of 2005 there were significant funding shortfalls in about three quarters of 
the traditional defined benefit pension plans that fall under federal jurisdiction in Canada. 
Warnings and calls for reform have come from many quarters including the Governor of 
the Bank of Canada and the Superintendent of Financial Institutions. Yet it appears at this 
time that neither the federal government nor most provincial governments have plans for 
pension reform. Since most private pension benefits are not guaranteed, the failure of firms 
to meet their pension obligations jeopardizes the income security of both current and future 
retirees. The situation is broadly similar elsewhere. 
 
The purpose of this conference is to bring together researchers, those who design 
and manage pension plans, and those responsible for pension policy, both from Canada and 
abroad, to discuss how vulnerable the current  system is, to identify possible directions of 
reform, and to consider how to implement them. We focus attention on issues relating to 
income security in retirement, and especially on the role of private pension plans. Our 
particular interest relates to the situation in Canada, but many problems are in common and 
experience elsewhere is of obvious relevance in providing guidance and informing decision 
making here. Among the topics that we address: 
 
The private pension system: challenges and possible responses 
$  Declining coverage in occupational pension plans 
$  Funding problems in occupational pension plans, and the role of government 
guarantees 
$  Increasing shifts from defined benefit to defined contribution plans and their 
implications for individual risks  
 
The retirement income system: current challenges and future prospects 
$  The changing roles of public and private pensions in income replacement 
$  Poverty in old age, especially among vulnerable groups 
$  Trends in the level, security, and distribution of retirement incomes 
   3
The international reform experience in other countries 
$  Designs of multi-pillar systems (e.g., US, UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, 
Australia)  
$  Changes in public pension provision (e.g., notional defined contribution systems) 
$  Changes in private pension regulation  
 
The conference is organized by the SEDAP (Social and Economic Dimensions of an Aging 
Population) Research Program, which is centred at McMaster University, with the active 
support of two federal government agencies B Human Resources and Social Development 
Canada and the Policy Research Initiative B and the Institute of Insurance and Pension 
Research at the University of Waterloo.  
 
The conference organizers are: Robert Brown (University of Waterloo),  Jeff Carr (PRI), 
Martin Hering (McMaster University), Mario Jametti (York University), Gordon Lenjosek 
(HRSDC), Byron Spencer (McMaster University) 
 
SEDAP receives major support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 
of Canada under the terms of its Major Collaborative Research Initiative.   4
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Opening Session B 6:00 pm 
Welcome: Byron Spencer, Economics, McMaster 
Chair: William Scarth, Economics, McMaster 
University 
 
William Robson, President & CEO, 










How vulnerable are private pensions? Is there 
a funding crisis?   
 
8:45  - 10:45 
 
Chair: Steve Bonnar, Principal, Towers Perrin 
 
Jack Selody, Advisor to the Governor, Bank of 
Canada 
Karen Badgerow-Croteau, Managing Director, 
Private Pension Plans Division, Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
Bob Baldwin, former Director of Research, 
Canadian Labour Congress 





What should the regulations say? What should 
the regulators do?  
 
11:00 - 12:30 
 
Chair: Bruce Macnaughton, Director, Pension 
and Income Security Branch, Ontario Ministry 
of Finance 
 
Michael Orszag, Head of Research, Watson 
Wyatt Worldwide; Research Chair, 
International Network of Pension Regulators 
and Supervisors  
John Por, President, Cortex Applied Research 
Inc. 
David Gordon, Deputy Superintendent, 
Pensions, Financial Services Commission of 
Ontario 
Diane Lafleur, Director, Financial Sector 




Lunch B 12:30 
 
Chair: Peter Hicks, Executive Director, Strategic 
Analysis, Audit and Evaluation Branch, 
HRSDC 
 
Keith Ambachtsheer, Director, Rotman 
International Centre for Pension 
Management, University of Toronto, Why we 




Income security in old age I: Where are we 
now? How secure is the future? 
 
2:00 - 3:30  
 
Chair: Bob Baldwin, former Director of 
Research, Canadian Labour Congress 
 
Kevin Milligan, Economics, University of 
British Columbia 
Jean-Claude Ménard, Chief Actuary, Office of 
the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
Canada 
Susann Rohwedder,  Economist, RAND 
Michael Veall, Economics, McMaster 





Income security in old age II: Where are we 
now? How secure is the future? 
 
4:00 - 5:30 
 
Chair: Bob Baldwin, former Director of 
Research, Canadian Labour Congress  
 
Geoff Rowe and Michael Wolfson,  Statistics 
Canada 
René Morissette, Assistant Director, Business 
Labour and Market Analysis, Statistics 
Canada 
Tom Crossley, Economics, McMaster 
University and University of Cambridge 





Dinner B 6:00 
Chair: Tom Crossley, Economics, McMaster 
University and University of Cambridge 
 
Richard Disney, Economics, University of 
Nottingham, Encouraging saving for 











Reforming pensions: Why is it so hard to 
make improvements? 
 
8:45 - 10:45 
 
Chair: Martin Hering, Political Science and 




Kent Weaver, Public Policy Institute, 
Georgetown University  
Keith Banting, School of Policy Studies and 
Department of Political Studies, Queen's 
University 
Cliff Halliwell, Director General, Strategic 
Policy Research, Strategic Analysis, Audit 
and Evaluation Branch, Human Resources 
and Social Development Canada 
Bruce Macnaughton, Director, Pension and 
Income Security Branch, Ontario Ministry of 
Finance 
Joel Harden, National Representative 




International perspectives on income security 
in old age 
 
11:00 - 12:30 
 
Chair: Mario Jametti, Economics, York 
University 
 
Garry Barrett, Economics, University of New 
South Wales  
Michael Hurd, Director, RAND Center for the 
Study of Aging 
Martin Hering & Michael Kpessa, Political 





Lunch B 12:30 
 
Chair: Martin Dooley, Economics, McMaster 
University 
 
Robert Willis, Economics, University of 
Michigan, Director, Health and Retirement 




Major on-going problems: What are the policy 
options? 
 
2:00 - 3:45 
 
Chair: Brian FitzGerald, President, Canadian 
Institute of Actuaries 
 
 
Ken Georgetti, President, Canadian Labour 
Congress 
Jack Selody, Advisor to the Governor, Bank of 
Canada  
William Robson, President & CEO, CD Howe 
Institute 
Malcolm Hamilton, Worldwide Partner, Mercer 
Human Resource Consulting 
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Byron Spencer, Economics, McMaster University  
 
Byron Spencer identified four key challenges that defined benefit pension plans are 
facing: (1) financial sustainability due to a shortfall in funding, (2) the size of pensions 
(since Canadian trustee funds have a market value equal to half of GDP, even small 
reallocations have an impact on financial markets), (3) plan-level concerns about funding 
shortfalls and insolvency risks, and (4) individual-level concerns (most people outside the 
public sector have no coverage, there are uncertainties about future benefits, and inflation 





William Robson, President and CEO, CD Howe Institute 
 
Bill Robson highlighted the aptness of the term “uncertain” in the conference title, 
stressing the distinction between taking risks in games where we know the odds and 
dealing in uncertainty when the probabilities are unclear. He argued that we have tended to 
approach DB pensions as though we did know the probabilities, but that a review of history 
shows how unrepresentative data from the period when those plans grew to maturity might 
be. In the 1950s and the 1960s, rapid growth of population and incomes inspired pay-as-
you-go public safety-net plans, while comparatively low yields on debt and revaluations 
that produced high returns on shares made DB plan sponsors think they could fund lavish 
benefits with modest contributions. Reverses on all these fronts prompted fiscal 
consolidations and partial funding of the CPP in the 1990s, and are subjecting DB plans to 
huge stresses now. He pointed out that DB plans are under additional pressure from 
legislation and case law that makes surpluses hard to run, but that fixing these problems 
would not necessarily return the DB sector to health. According to Robson, individual 
saving options such as RRSPs are not congenial alternatives to many people, and Canada 
should turn its attention in two separate directions. First, Canadians should look to pooled 
money-purchase plans that would provide participants with some of the security of DB 
plans without the agency problems and poorly understood exposures that afflict those 
plans. Second, he advocated that reforms to compensation, including pension plans, should 
focus on attracting, training and retaining labour, including the growing numbers of 
workers who under current arrangements will likely leave the workforce while they still 
have much to contribute. He closed by observing that many of the most promising 
solutions to the pension crisis are to be found in human resource departments, where 
keeping older workers engaged and productive will be a priority in the future. 
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How vulnerable are private pensions? Is there a funding crisis? 
 
 
Jack Selody, Advisor to the Governor, Bank of Canada 
 
An effective pension system is important for economic and financial efficiency. A 
large majority of pension plans in Canada are DB plans (95%). DB plans are under stress. 
The proximate causes of the stress include the general trends of longevity and early 
retirement, low long-term interest rates, and the gradual disappearance of the equity 
premium.  The most basic cause of pension plan stress includes misconceptions and the 
complexity of plans, the interdepencency of issues, and the narrow perspectives of various 
stakeholders that lead to only marginal changes and push the problems of funding to plan 
sponsors. Some of the misconceptions are that employers pay for part of DB plans, 
sponsors can transfer risk to members, pension funds are there to keep the plan in balance 
and a surplus means contribution rates were too high. DB pension plans have five 
vulnerabilities: (1) inappropriate restrictions on pension fund management—sponsors need 
control over funds in order to manage risk and guarantee promised benefits. Unclear 
ownership and limited access to the pension fund limits incentives to accumulate surpluses. 
(2) Inappropriate valuation methods—for healthy companies, the going-concern test is 
proper, but the solvency test is not appropriate since it creates an artifical burden for the 
sponsor. (3) Inappropriate accounting rules—market value accounting is very precise, but 
not the right concept for long-dated assets and liabilities. A better indicator of future prices 
is needed, one that is appropriate for when liabilities become due. (4) Inappropriate 
operating practices—the tendency to keep contribution rates stable is not good. If benefits 
remain stable, then the contribution rate needs to be flexible. (5) Inappropriate pension 
designs—sponsors take on an immense amount of risk, but have little insurance against 
these risks. In a nutshell, DB plans are complex and inter-woven with many elements. But 
changes are made in isolation have tended to push the burden further to sponsors. 
Suggestions for the way forward must be aimed at strengthening incentives to eliminate 
deficits, remove surplus ownership ambiguities, and give symmetric access to surpluses for 
credit worthy sponsors. Refine adequacy testing with less emphasis on solvency tests for 
credit worthy sponsors; balance accuracy and alignment with economic fundamentals in 
pension accounting; improve members’ awareness of how DB pensions work so 
contribution rates can be more responsive to changes; encourage contingent elements in 
DB pensions and make these contingencies explicit. 
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Karen Badgerow-Croteau, Managing Director, Private Pension Plans Division, Office of 
the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
 
There are a number of challenges that pensions are facing. These include issues 
relating to the funding ratio, difficulties in predicting the future and operating in a litigious 
environment. This has led to the introduction of the new commuted values standards and 
new proposals for changes to accounting operations. These new initiatives have led a 
limited number of plans to seek benefit reductions. Reductions now range from 4% to 11%.  
There are also increases in requests for innovative approaches to funding but it is important 
to mention that the majority of plans continue to meet regulatory requirements.  There are a 
number of opportunities for regulators to focus on clarifying policies and guidelines and 
ensuring that regulations reflect the current environment and are consistent with the 
legislative framework. There is also the need for regulators to provide a better 
understanding of risks. For plan administrators, there is the opportunity to focus on plan 
business but it is also imperative for them to achieve a greater understanding not only of 
risks but also of the necessary techniques to manage risk. Administrators must also enforce 
the right operating models. There are, however, few cautions: stakeholders need to avoid 
highlighting a few flaws at the expense of many merits. This requires an approach that 
would allow stakeholders to step outside their narrow perspectives and consider the point 
of view of competing stakeholders in order to find a win-win solution. The good news is 
that there are a number of new initiatives. The federal government’s new 10-year funding 
relief, Quebec’s solvency funding relief, Ontario’s recently announced panel of experts and 
other similar initiatives across various provinces are examples of the good wind blowing 
across the pensions landscape. 
 
 
Bob Baldwin, Former Director of Social and Economic Policy, Canada Labour Congress 
 
The blissful 1980s and 1990s disappeared with declining stock prices and interest 
rates. Regular surpluses of pension funds disappeared. The percentage of DB plans in 
Ontario that are underfunded on a solvency basis increased from 58% in 2001, to 76% in 
2002, to 83% in 2004.  Current concerns about DB plans include: increases in employer 
DB contributions (from 6 billion dollars to 18 billion dollars), a rising conversion from DB 
to DC, and benefit insecurity (examples are Air Canada and Stelco). The impacts of recent 
changes on DC plans are a smaller asset accumulation and higher annuity prices. Despite 
the difficulties that DB plans are facing, Baldwin argued that they still show a strong 
presence: there are 7,000 DB plans with 4.8 million members, mostly among unionized 
private sector workers, public sector employees and executives. Baldwin indicated that 
both plan sponsors and beneficiaries face risks in terms of contributions and benefits. One 
of the main problems is that there is a strong tendency for risk-taking in Canada: the 
Income Tax Act limits surplus accumulation, the discount rates used imply a significant 
amount of risk, and many pension funds have high equity content. Possible solutions 
include new regulatory rules (for example the proposals from the Quebec and federal 
governments to apply different rules depending on the sponsor’s credit-worthiness, 
different amortization rules, and new funding targets that are linked to funds’ investment 
portfolios). Thus, the future of RPPs is critical, since they are an incredibly important   9
source of income. But their coverage has seen little progress since the 1980s. Overall, there 
are a number of key problems that DB plans need to resolve, but there is not a crisis. 
 
 
James Pesando, Economics, University of Toronto 
 
The cases of Air Canada and Stelco show that there is real risk of company 
bankruptcy. Reports show that jurisdictions other than Ontario will go down the route of 
termination insurance for pension funds. James Pesando argued that this is absolutely the 
wrong path. He examined the issue of pension plan termination from the perspective of the 
rational decision-making model. In his view, it is unfair that workers suffer from the 
bankruptcy of their firms. This is because pensions are deferred wages. Using rational 
decision theory, he argued that workers are usually not well informed about the kinds of 
decision they make. In his view, workers generally do not understand the risks to which 
pension plans are exposed. Even if workers were well informed, policy makers would not 
allow them to bear the price of pension liabilities due to the nature of the political process. 
In his view, if workers are well informed about the details of pensions, it would be more 
likely that they would choose firms where pension plans are fully funded. He also argued 
that since the political process does not allow premiums at actuarially fair levels (premiums 
would have to be 20 times as high or low depending on a pension plan’s funding and 
investments), termination insurance is not an adequate response. For example, in Ontario 
termination insurance has been a subsidy to declining industries, but not good public 
policy. During the discussion on the issue, Malcolm Hamilton argued that crises in DB 
plans are sometimes the result of a discovery by plan sponsors that they took on risks that 
they did not know about. The lack of crucial information at the time of decision-making 





What should the regulations say? What should the regulators do?  
 
 
Michael Orszag, Head of Research, Watson Wyatt Worldwide; Research Chair, 
International Network of Pension Regulators and Supervisors. 
 
Using data from the US and UK, Michael Orszag pointed out that risks in DB 
pension plans are not equally distributed: there is a huge concentration of risks in a small 
proportion of firms, but the majority has only medium or small risks. Governmental 
regulations are often not flexible enough and too prescriptive. Regulations should be 
targeted at high-risk firms with chronic underfunding issues. Better risk management and 
more education would be sufficient measures for medium-risk and low-risk firms, 
respectively. An important question is whether existing risk measures are appropriate. 
Traditional risk measures look only at funding ratios. The appropriate risk measures must 
be based on the following formula: benefit security equals financial security (ability to pay) 
plus a covenant (requirement to pay) plus governance. Other types of guidelines include:   10
governance requirements, funding rules, risk-based premiums for guarantee schemes, 
priority creditor rights in case of sponsor bankruptcy, risk controls, vesting and portability 
of benefits, and indexation requirements. Different exposures to risk exist not only in DB 
plans, but also in DC ones because there is no average individual. The question is which 
measures are needed for which groups. For high-risk individuals, there should be strong 
defaults, for medium-risk individuals, only weak ones, and for low-risk individuals, 
education and incentives may be sufficient. To conclude, there is a strong case to be made 
for segmenting regulatory and supervisory attention into different groups and for a more 
targeted approach to regulation and supervision. 
 
 
John Por, President, Cortex Applied Research Inc. 
 
John Por argued that we do not get to the core issues in pension plan regulation 
because there is too much disagreement. Because of this, we talk about other issues which 
are trivial (harmonization) or which should not be dealt with by regulators (governance). 
The slow death of DB plans is caused by over-regulation of pension plans and the fact that 
public policy ignores financial economics. It would be better not to over-regulate given our 
imperfect knowledge. The purposes of legislation and regulation should be the following: 
(1) creating a viable retirement regime over and above the CPP, (2) encouraging employers 
to run pension plans, whether DB or DC ones, (3) encourage employees to save for 
retirement, (4) ensure benefit security, (5) resolve the question of surplus ownership, and 
(6) ensure that current arrangements are intergenerationally fair. Por argued that not much 
thought is given to these issues. Instead, we talk only about best models of government 
which is not a core issue. 
 
 
David Gordon, Deputy Superintendent, Pensions, Financial Services Commission of 
Ontario 
 
David Gordon gave an overview of the work of the Financial Services Commission 
of Ontario (FSCO) whose mandate is to protect the public interest and enhance public 
confidence. There are about 7000 plans currently active in Ontario. It is worth noting that 
pensions are under provincial jurisdiction, and that 9 out of 10 provinces have their own 
regulations which are often contradictory and inconsistent with each other. Since most of 
the multi-jurisdictional plans are registered in Ontario, the FSCO tries to administer 10 
different provincial pension statutes. In Ontario, some of the regulatory rules are outdated 
since they have not been updated since 1985. In addition, the environment has become 
litigious which often does not help to protect the public interest. There is a collision 
between trust law and pension law, and the FSCO now also has become a trust law 
regulator. Regulators are often highly limited in the extent to which they can act. For 
example, in Alberta the regulator has the power to replace administrators, but in Ontario it 
does not have that power. Bankruptcy and solvency of employers are a growing area of 
concern. One of the problems is that no one independently represents a plan throughout the 
process of restructuring. Thus, the plan often deteriorates further in this process.  Given the 
experience of Ontario, it is important to review legislation on pensions. There should be   11
more tools available to take appropriate actions, more power and flexibility to react to the 
changing pensions landscape, more rule-making authority delegated to regulators since 




Diane Lafleur, Director, Financial Sector Division, Finance Canada 
 
The Air Canada case focused the attention of policymakers on the challenges that 
DB plans are facing. On the one hand, the government noted that it would examine 
extending the rules made for Air Canada more broadly to other companies in similar 
circumstances. On the other hand, the Air Canada case also led to a broader review of 
issues facing defined benefit plans. The Department of Finance Canada put out a 
consultation paper on the framework governing federally regulated defined benefit pension 
plans that raised key questions for stakeholders’ views in May 2005.  The paper generated 
a significant number of submissions, more than 130, showing that pension plan regulation 
is an important issue. A general view that emerged was that funding was an immediate 
issue affecting plan sponsors, employees and retirees. Budget 2006 proposed temporary 
measures to provide funding relief, with a view to re-establishing full funding while 
providing protection for pension benefits.  The measures also allow plans to make choices 
as to which measure is most appropriate given its particular circumstances. The measures 
include the consolidation of past and current deficits in order to get a fresh start for 5 years, 
and extensions of the solvency funding period to 10 years, subject to various terms and 
conditions, for example with the use of letters of credit to protect pension benefits. 
Sponsors were pleased and the whole exercise was viewed as a positive first step. Diane 
Lafleur noted that a number of factors have contributed to a trend from defined benefit to 
defined contribution plans, with both employers and employees contributing to this trend.  
The Department of Finance will be examining the reasons for this trend, and to the extent 
possible, will seek to ensure that the regulatory framework is balanced so as to not create 
incentives or disincentives for sponsors who are trying to decide whether to set up a 
defined benefit or defined contribution plan. However, realistically it would be difficult to 
reverse the trend. In this context, it was indicated that the Department of Finance will 
continue to examine means to strengthen the viability of defined benefit plans and examine 
the framework governing defined contribution plans.  
 
 




Keith Ambachtsheer, Director, Rotman International Centre for Pension Management, 
University of Toronto 
 
Keith Ambachtsheer argued that Canada does not have a set of comprehensive, 
integrated public policies regarding private pension system design, implementation, or 
regulation and that Canada’s pension system needs dramatic, far-reaching change. The 
current DB and DC pension arrangements themselves suffer from serious design flaws. 
Many of the mechanisms currently being employed to deliver private pensions suffer 
serious agency- and governance-related impediments. Canadian pension guarantees are 
fuzzy rather than clear and regulators are far too easy on poorly-governed plans. In 
addition, the Canadian system as a whole is fragmented, poorly understood, flying largely 
under the radar screen of Canadians at large. DB plans suffer from a fatal design flaw by 
socializing embedded risks. Invariably, these risks are badly defined and measured, and 
hence haphazardly allocated between various classes of DB plan stakeholders. DC plans 
also have flaws, including irrational individual decisions, high administrative fees and the 
absence of pooling of longevity risks. 
Ambachtsheer showed that there are options for reform. There is the need to 
develop a broad consensus on a vision of what Canada’s private pension system should 
look like, and align public policy with that vision. We must take into account the need to 
design a pension formula that combines the best of DB and DC arrangements, but avoids 
their pitfalls. Furthermore, there is the need to develop pension delivery organizations that 
are arms-length and properly governed. The existing reform approach in Canada is best 
described as piecemeal, fragmented, and timid. We need an approach that is focused, 
integrative, and bold. Robert Merton sketched the outline of the optimal pension formula 
some 35 years ago. Out of that first sketch has evolved the individual life-cycle pension 
model that morphs into a life-annuity with the passage of time. In implementing the model, 
the ‘human foibles’ problem must be addressed through auto-enrolment and auto-pilot 
features. The proposal for non-covered citizens made by the Turner commission in the UK 
has many of the features of “The Optimal Pension System” (TOPS). The Ontario Teachers’ 
Pension Plan is a good example of a low cost pension delivery organization: it has a large 
scale, much expertise, aligned interests and good governance. 
Canada needs a new vision for the private pension system. Significant change in 
Canada will require our equivalent of the UK’s Turner commission and cooperation 
between the provinces and the federal government. Only such a holistic, integrative process 
will produce a new vision for our private pension system, and lead to revision of our 
pension laws and regulatory processes so that they are consistent with this new vision. An 
important reform measure is the adoption of a new, more effective pension formula. The 
Saskatchewan Teachers’ Pension Plan is a good example, combining flexible benefits with 
flexible contributions. There is a window of opportunity opening in the corporate sector 
since DB plans are being closed. But now we must convince corporate managers to do 
better than just offer employees a ‘plain vanilla’ DC plan. 
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SESSION 4 
Income security in Old Age: Where are we now? How secure is the future? 
 
 
Kevin Milligan, Economics, University of British Columbia 
 
Kevin Milligan showed how changes in income have changed elderly poverty in 
Canada. There were huge changes in the sources and composition of income for the elderly 
in Canada over the last 35 years. A 70-year old person in 1971 had income from OAS, the 
spouse’s RPP and perhaps a little GIS. But in 2006, a 70-year old might have income from 
OAS, the CPP, possibly two RPPs and perhaps an expanded GIS. The evolution of elderly 
poverty in Canada shows that there was a drop in 1970s due to a real GIS increase of 41 
percent and rising eligibility for the CPP. In 1970s, elderly poverty was a major issue in 
Canada, but in the past 35 years, both income and consumption poverty has decreased 
tremendously. There were some increases in relative poverty since the mid-1990s, but real 
incomes of the elderly were still rising across the distribution. Milligan’s analysis also 
showed that the consumption poverty level depends heavily on housing imputation. 
 
 
Jean-Claude Ménard, Chief Actuary, Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions Canada 
 
The Canadian retirement system with mixed funding approaches is well recognized 
in the world for its capacity to adapt rapidly to changing conditions. For instance it is 
currently made up of full funding (RPP/RRSP); partial funding (CPP/QPP); and pay-as-
you-go financing (OAS/GIS). Overall, the Canadian system is about 40 to 45 percent 
funded. The Canadian retirement system is more generous than the American one at the 
level of half median income, comparable at median income and less generous at 1.5 or 2 
times median income. The number of people 65 years or older in Canada is expected to 
increase from 4 million today to 10 million in 2050, which represents an increase from 12 
to 24 percent of the population. Canada and the US are the only countries in the advanced 
industrialized world to expect an increase in working age population. After the last 
actuarial report, the steady-state contribution rate for the CPP is 9.8 percent. If present 
conditions continued, the plan would be fully funded in 2307. But if contributions were 
increased by a small amount and the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board did well, 
Canada could have a fully funded plan in this century. 
 
 
Susann Rohwedder, Economist, RAND 
 
Susann Rohwedder, in a paper co-authored with Michael Hurd, sought to explain 
the changes in retirement resources for the elderly, focusing on private pensions and 
savings. Using the US Health and Retirement Study, she showed that for persons aged 51 
to 56 years, there was a small growth in the median wealth between 1992 and 2000, but a 
significant growth in average wealth. Median non-housing wealth even declined during this 
period. There were big changes in the pension landscape over the past two decades. Even   14
though the coverage of employees with workplace pension benefits stayed the same, and 
increased for women, there was a shift from DB plans to DC ones. A key question is what 
these plans are worth. The main problem is the lack of knowledge of plans, and the 
incomplete and inconsistent answers that many respondents give in surveys. The solution 
employed by Rohwedder was to ask people about their pension plan at the time of job 
separation. She found that there were marked increases in pension wealth from DC plans 
between 1994 and 2002, flat wealth for DB plans despite declining coverage, and 
increasing DB wealth among females. As far as pension entitlements of households were 
concerned, there were substantial increases in DC wealth and increases in DB wealth 
mainly due to increases in the labor force participation of women, a trend that is not 
expected to continue. Overall, there is no crisis in retirement provision because there were 
increases in retirement resources on average, pensions continue to be major component of 
retirement portfolio, and DC plans have become more important, especially because of 
their portability. The greatest challenge of DC plans is to manage investment risks. 
 
 
Michael Veall, Economics, McMaster University 
 
Michael Veall showed that the development of senior poverty in Canada since the 
1970s has been an unusual experience internationally: Canada had one of the highest senior 
poverty rates within the industrialized world in the 1970s, but nowadays it has a very low 
one. He measures the senior poverty rate as the percentage of seniors with income below 
the low-income measure or LIM, that is 50% of the median of adjusted family income. The 
general population poverty rate in Canada is higher than the senior poverty rate, which is 
not the case in most other countries. The Canadian retirement income system puts persons 
with low incomes just over the LIM threshold of 50% of the median adjusted family 
income. Nonetheless, 6% of seniors fall below LIM. Veall decomposed the 6% of 
Canadian seniors who are poor.  Some groups are disproportionally poor. The below-LIM 
rate for widowers and widows rises after the loss of their spouse, for example, for women 
from 1% to 8%. Using the Longitudinal Administrative Database, Veall showed that 
divorced, separated or single elderly persons have a much higher poverty rate than married 
persons. A group with a very high poverty rate are elderly immigrants, especially more 
recent ones. The below-LIM rate for non-immigrants is only about 5 percent, but that for 
immigrants is more than 70 percent. By contrast, the poverty rate for married, non-
immigrant persons is only about 3 percent, which is less than half the overall rate. 
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SESSION 5 
Income security in old age II: Where are we now? How secure is the future? 
 
Geoff Rowe & Michael Wolfson, Statistics Canada 
 
Using Statistics Canada’s LifePaths microsimulation model, Geoff Rowe and 
Michael Wolfson studied the trends in retirement income security and risk-sharing in 
Canadian families. They showed that there has been a major increase in the labour force 
participation in the past 30 years, mostly due to an increased participation by women. 
Female participation rates now equal those of men, and women have disproportionally 
gone into the public sector where RPP coverage is highest. This has led to a gradual 
convergence of RPP coverage of men and women at the level of about 40 percent. An 
important question is whether women’s expected future gains in pension entitlements will 
be able to offset men’s losses. We can expect significant increases in RPP incomes of 
couples. We are likely to see a levelling-off of benefits until 2020 to 2025, but then a sharp 
increase. Overall, the higher labour market participation of women will lead to higher 
pension entitlements. Women will no longer depend on their spouse’s pension. In spite of 




René Morissette, Assistant Director, Business and Labour Market Analysis Division, 
Statistics Canada 
 
René Morissette, in a paper co-authored with Yuri Ostrovsky, showed trends in 
pension coverage and retirement savings of Canadians in the past two decades. The level of 
coverage by DB plans for men declined from 49% to 31%. Since there was only a slight 
increase from 3% to 7% in DC plan coverage, the growth in coverage by DC plans since 
the late 1970s was not enough to compensate for the decline in workers’ coverage by DB 
plans. Falling unionization rates and employment shifts towards low-coverage industries 
were strongly correlated with the drop in RPP coverage between the mid-1980s and the 
mid-1990s. The decline in RPP coverage has led to a downward shift in the age-coverage 
profile of young men. While RPP coverage fell among unmarried women, it rose among 
married women. Thus, wives’ increase in coverage helped mitigate the decline in 
husbands’ coverage. The percentage of prime-aged couples with at least one RPP fell from 
66.5% in 1991 to 61.9% in 2004. Couples’ contributions for retirement have become more 
unequally distributed than they were in the mid-1980s. The growth in inequality of 
contributions resulted mainly from growing inequality in RRSP contributions. For 
example, couples in the top earnings quintile have much higher RRSP contributions than 
those in the medium or lower quintiles. This growing inequality in families’ contributions 
towards retirement could eventually raise family income inequality among the elderly, after 
two decades of declining inequality. In addition, since women with an RPP are more likely 
to marry men who also have an RPP, income polarization among the elderly might grow. 
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Tom Crossley, Economics, McMaster University and University of Cambridge 
 
Thomas Crossley tried to assess the adequacy of financial preparations for 
retirement in Canada. He defined adequate preparations as preparations that allow a 
household to enjoy living standards that are roughly the same after retirement as prior to 
retirement. Financial preparations would include the accumulation of privately held assets 
(both financial and real) and of entitlements to public and private pensions. He considered 
both currently working cohorts and currently retired cohorts. In both instances, he 
emphasized limitations of currently available data. Those currently working should be 
saving towards their retirement years. National Accounts data show that there was a very 
significant drop in the aggregate private savings rate in Canada between 1980 and 2005. 
However, Crossley reported that a study of household level data does not show such a 
drop: the personal savings rate remained the same or even increased. The discrepancy 
between these data sources is an unresolved and important puzzle. The infrequency of 
wealth surveys in Canada mean that those surveys add little to this picture. Crossley then 
turned to currently retired Canadians. We know that income (relative to pre-retirement) 
falls at retirement. However, income is not a comprehensive measure of financial 
resources. Expenditure is closely related to financial resources if households are sensible 
and forward- looking. We also know that expenditure falls at retirement (the `retirement 
consumption puzzle’). However recent research in both the U.S. and Canada has 
emphasized that expenditure is not consumption, that there are variety of ways in which 
retired individuals might maintain consumption while lowering expenditures. It also 
appears that the expenditure fall at retirement is planned (or at least anticipated). As an 
alternative to income or expenditure, Crossley looked at subjective financial satisfaction in 
the General Social Surveys. Those survey data show that not many elderly are dissatisfied, 
and that among those who experience dissatisfaction with some aspect of life, the reason 
for dissatisfaction is mostly health, not finances. Thus, we have at least crude evidence that 
financial preparations for retirement have been adequate. Crossley concluded that Canada 
needs better data on savings and wealth, and also more frequent (and especially panel) data 
for retirees and near retirees. 
 
 
Michael Baker, Economics, University of Toronto 
 
Michael Baker looked at the relationship between the retirement income system and 
economic well-being in Canada. While a very general view of well-being could be taken, 
in many studies the emphasis is on income security. Other measures of well-being include 
lifespan, independence, happiness and financial stress. There are empirical challenges in 
determining the role of the income support (IS) system. The public IS system insures 
against income inadequacy, longevity risk, investment risk and inflation risk, but clearly 
not against the risk of changes to the public IS system. Studies showed that the IS system 
played a significant role in the reduction of low income. Surprisingly, they did not find a 
strong link between the IS system and low consumption. Kevin Milligan’s simulations 
suggest that the interaction of the actuarial adjustment of the CPP/QPP between the ages of 
60 and 70 and the income testing of the GIS leads low income individuals to retire too 
early. International studies show that any work disincentives in IS systems do influence the   17
decision to retire. The effects of such incentives in Canada are significant and similar to 
those in the U.S., but much smaller than the effects estimated for countries in Europe. 
Regarding the private system, the RPP plans insure against income inadequacy. DB plans 
provide insurance against the longevity risk, investment risk and in some cases, inflation 
risk. There are no Canadian data that can support the analysis of the impact of the RPPs on 
measures of welfare or of the behavioral effects of the RPP system. Simulations suggest 
that many RPPs provide strong incentives to retire at specific ages. Canadian evidence 
suggests that the design of the RRSP program encourages participation in it. Less clear is 
whether these savings are used in retirement and whether overall savings are increased. 
The U.S. evidence is inconclusive, but suggests that total saving is increased by tax-
preferred programs. Targeting of other income security programs may discourage 
participation of low-income individuals in RRSPs. Our three-pillar system of support 
(public IS, RPPs and RRSPs/private savings) operates like a one-pillar system for a 
significant minority. This is because RPPs are not universal and because program targeting 
discourages private saving. An important question is whether there is a growing dependent 







Richard Disney, Economics, University of Nottingham 
 
Richard Disney analyzed the policies and incentives to increase retirement savings 
in the UK. The UK does not have a social security crisis like other EU countries. The 
problem in the UK is too frequent policy revisions. For individuals, retirement planning is 
difficult if the government changes the framework every few years, which has become 
characteristic of the UK’s pensions policy. In addition, policy analysts are unable to 
analyze policy outcomes due to the frequency of change in policy arrangements. The UK 
pension system has a structure similar to the Canadian one. In contrast to Canada, the  
earnings-related component was reduced and the income-tested or means-tested 
components (Pension Credit) have been increased through indexation to earnings, not 
prices, and the reduction of extra income at a lower rate. Due to these reforms, the 
replacement rates for median earners will decline slightly overall, but the composition will 
change. Low earners will see higher replacement rates due to the Pension Credit. The 
public pension system is strongly redistributive. On the one hand, there has been a growth 
of income-testing, but on the other a decline of the contributory program (which has been 
stopped by the 2006 reform by indexing contributory benefits to earnings). The distinctive 
feature of the UK’s pension system is that workers can opt out of the contributory program 
(S2P), or join both the S2P and private pension plans. The reform strategy in UK was to 
encourage people to opt out. Yet, the perception was that previous reforms did not work 
since too many opted for Personal Pensions, and too few for Stakeholder Pensions. 
Voluntarism was seen as a failure which is why the Turner commission recently proposed 
automatic enrolment as an alternative. Personal Pensions, introduced in 1988, are 
individual insurance contracts. The conditions for opt-out were made very favourable: 6   18
million people opted out, instead of the expected 1.5 million people. The opt-out occurred 
mostly among young people because of incentives like compound interest. As a response, 
age-related rebates were introduced in 1997. The composition of those who opted out 
changed after this reform. Many people also made extra savings. New Labour’s 
Stakeholder Pensions required that all firms offer a provider of these pensions. There were 
ceilings on administrative charges, but no automatic enrolment. The take up was 
disappointingly low. Even though the policy was targeted at medium income earners, their 
coverage went down. An unintended effect was the increase of coverage among low 
earners, which resulted from tax incentives. Households with one medium earner and one 









Reforming pensions: Why is it so hard to make improvements? 
 
 
Kent Weaver, Public Policy Institute, Georgetown University and Brookings Institution 
 
Kent Weaver gave an overview and explanation of pension regime change in 
advanced industrialized countries. He showed that countries hardly ever change between 
the three broad categories of pension regimes (universal/citizenship, Bismarckian and 
residual). The conventional wisdom is that pension regime change has been largely 
incremental (or “parametric”) rather than fundamental (or “paradigmatic”). Welfare states 
have survived economic and demographic retrenchment pressures relatively intact. Positive 
policy feedbacks limit the pension reform options of policy-makers by constraining choice 
sets. They also create constituencies who resist any change that would make them worse 
off. In addition, the age and maturity of pension regimes, especially the double payment 
problem, constrain reforms. Weaver argued that we need to recategorize pension regimes 
since virtually all rich countries have multi-tiered pension systems that are organized in a 
variety of ways. For example, Canada has the OAS, GIS, CPP/QPP, and tax-advantaged 
RRP and RRSPs. He suggested to add new categories to the three existing ones: 
Bismarckian-light regimes (including Canada and the United States), notional defined 
contribution (NDC) regimes (such as Italy and Sweden), and mixed regimes (such as the 
UK, the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland). Using these categories, Weaver showed 
that pension regime change is more frequent than often assumed, and that pension regimes 
differ significantly in their durability. Bismarckian-light regimes and mixed regimes were 
highly durable in the post-WW II period (corresponding to the cul-de-sac model of 
change). Universal and residual regimes virtually disappeared after World War II, with 
multiple destinations (paths and forks model). Bismarckian regimes were very durable until 
the mid-1990s when some of them shifted to NDC. Policy feedbacks may undermine as 
well as reinforce existing regimes. The prospects for regime change depend on the   19
following factors; (1) the balance of positive and negative feedbacks and the challenges 
they present, (2) the availability and efficacy of incremental reforms to address those 
challenges, and (3) the availability of regime transition options. Canada’s pension system 
has multiple incremental reform options and a few regime transition options, but also much 
less need for fundamental reforms. Weaver scored the Canadian system according to a 
number of criteria, assigning it an A- for adequacy, a B for affordability, and a C+ for 
encouraging continued labour force participation, and an A- for political risk. 
 
 
Keith Banting, School of Policy Studies and Department of Political Science, Queen’s 
University 
 
Keith Banting traced the development of Canada’s pension system and addressed 
three key questions: why is pension reform difficult, what is the Canadian experience, and 
what are the prospects for future changes?  In his view, two theories, path dependency and 
institutional complexity, explain why it is so hard to reform pension arrangements. The 
notion of path dependency means that the history of pension policy matters, timing and 
sequence shape long-term outcomes, and programs become embedded in institutions, 
interests, and public expectations. Thus, change is incremental and often bounded by the 
existing framework. Path dependency arguments assume that change to a new path is 
difficult and can take place only through a major shock. Institutional complexity adds to 
these constraints, for example, through the nature of federal institutional arrangements or 
the presence of veto points in the political system. The Canadian pension system is a 
mixture of public and private pensions. The public pillar is composed of both Beveridge- 
and Bismarck-style programs. The pension expenditure level in Canada is relatively low by 
international standards. The Canadian path of development started in the 1920s with 
means-tested public pensions and minimal coverage by private pensions. The first pillar 
was introduced in 1927, known as Old Age Pensions. In 1951, Old Age Security, a 
universal flat-rate benefit, was introduced. The Canadian second pillar, the CPP/QPP, was 
added in 1965. It was a modest program, leaving considerable room for the growth of a 
third, private pillar. It also allowed integration between public and occupational pension 
plans. But federal-provincial decision rules constrained the growth of the CPP. The 
Canadian system has been resilient to change even in the face of shocks. The “great 
pension debate” in the 1970s was a critical juncture, yet the debates ended with a rejection 
of proposals to double the CPP/QPP. Banting asked whether there is the possibility of a 
new path in the future. He argued that fiscal pressures will be manageable, Canada’s hybrid 
model is politically flexibility and there likely is limited scope for intergenerational 
conflict. Even though fundamental reforms are unlikely, there are prospects for further 
incremental change such as shifts in the balance among the pillars, and the weakening of 
some pillars. The OAS is politically unchallengeable due to its poverty-reducing role, but 
may weaken since it is indexed only to prices, not wages. The CPP is relatively secure, 
especially after the reforms of the 1990s. But the private pillar is vulnerable due to 
declining coverage and risk shifts. Thus, the retirement system is likely to continue on its 
path. It is hard to foresee any exogenous shocks that will push it in a different direction. In 
addition, even if a critical juncture occurred, a fundamental reorientation might not result   20
from it: in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s Canada considered a change in direction, but 
decided to stay on the same path.  
 
 
Cliff Halliwell, Director General, Strategic Policy Research, Strategic Analysis, Audit and 
Evaluation Branch, HRSDC 
 
On the question of why pensions are hard to reform, Cliff Halliwell identified some 
myths. These myths include: (1) the retirement income system cannot be changed, because 
it is impossible to succeed, (2) the retirement income system should not be changed, 
because people are counting on it, and (3) the retirement income system can only be 
reformed through big-bang, dramatic reforms. He argued that a multi-pillared system like 
Canada’s is complex and involves high information and knowledge demands, multiple 
perspectives and linked agendas, and different time horizons. Despite the claims that 
pension systems are hard to change, there have been a number of developments relating to 
private pensions and retirement savings which include: declining RPP coverage rates, a 
shift from DB to DC plans, under funding of DB plans, differential participation in RRSPs, 
and deficient knowledge of RPPs and the retirement income system as a whole. In addition, 
characteristics of the Canadian population and labour markets have changed due to 
increasing levels of educational attainment, a delayed entry into full-time employment, 
changes in family structures and an increased risk of union or marriage dissolution, 
growing non-standard employment, increased labour force participation among older 
adults, and greater longevity. Thus, despite the existing myths, pension systems have 
changed. Halliwell argued that reforms may not be easy, but are certainly possible. A 
requirement is that stakeholders appraise recent developments and examine various 
options. The greater challenge, though, is how to arrive at a consensus among the various 
stakeholders. But “improvements” should not be blocked by a failure to achieve consensus. 
 
 
Bruce Macnaughton, Director, Pensions and Income Security Branch, Ontario Ministry of 
Finance 
 
Bruce Macnaughton focused on the reform of occupational pension plans, 
especially on the issue of pension funding. He argued that reforms are difficult, and made 
four recommendations for overcoming present constraints: (1) governments, pension 
regulators and the actuarial profession must work together to develop funding standards for 
defined benefit pension plans, (2) governments must lead by example and be prepared to 
justify the differences in funding standards between public and private sector pension plans 
because reforms to pension benefit standards which apply to private sector plans will be 
difficult to achieve otherwise, (3) compromises among stakeholders including plan 
members, pensioners and employers will be essential if enduring comprehensive reforms 
are to be achieved, and (4) ad hoc reforms to address particular situations and reliance on 
courts to decide the direction of pension policy in the absence of action by legislatures is 
likely to lead to sub-optimal outcomes. Macnaugthon gave an overview of recent 
developments in occupational pension funding and raised a number of key issues questions. 
First, he argued that many stakeholders are involved in current debates about pension   21
funding, and that they emphasize different goals. The stakeholders include plan members 
and former members, plan sponsors as the parties bearing responsibility for financing the 
pension system, and citizens and pension regulators who administer pension standards 
legislation. An important question is whether the goal of reform is to strengthen funding 
rules and thereby improve benefit security, or to provide funding relief since arguably 
benefit security depends to a significant degree on the long term financial health of the plan 
sponsor, or some combination of the two. Second, Macnaughton pointed out that since 
responsibility for actuarial standards used in funding valuations is shared between the 
actuarial profession and governments, it is often blurred. Even though most pension 
legislation requires that funding valuations be prepared in accordance with accepted 
actuarial practice (AAP), pension standards legislation frequently permits significant 
departures from it. The question thus is how we can arrange for governments, pension 
regulators and the actuarial profession to work together on clear funding standards in a 
timely manner given that guidelines are blurred. Third, he argued that the term “private 
pension plans” is a misnomer since almost half of all pension plan members were 
employed in the public sector.  Since pension benefits standards legislation in most 
jurisdictions does not bind the Crown, private sector employers suggest that governments 
acting in their capacity as employers or transfer agents to public sector employers are 
unwilling to apply the funding standards which are applied to private pension plans to 
themselves. The question arises whether a reform of pension plan funding is possible 
without addressing the issue of the rules which govern the funding of public sector pension 
plans and the merits of the case for differences between the two sectors. Fourth, because 
provision of a pension plan to employees is desirable to governments, but voluntary on the 
part of employers, governments must balance the rules so as not to discourage employers 
from offering them. Thus, the question is what can or should be done to encourage 
employers to establish and maintain pension plans without undermining benefit security? 
Finally, where comprehensive pension reform does not occur, a system of special 
exemptions and regulations and “ad hoc” solutions may result. The courts often decide 
fundamental pension policy when legislation is ambiguous or silent. If governments 
intervene, they run the risk of being blamed both for the weak funding rules that 
contributed to the funding shortfall and for the onerous funding requirements that lead to 
the sponsor’s demise. The question is whether compromises among stakeholders are 
possible, and if so, how they can be arranged. 
 
 
Joel Harden, National Representative (Research), Canadian Labour Congress 
 
Joel Harden emphasized the importance of defending workplace pension benefits in 
Canada. The challenges that are most frequently mentioned in the pension debate are high 
liabilities, low interest rates, poor investment returns, over-regulation, unaffordable costs 
(hence the need to switch from DB to DC), and demographic change. Harden argued that in 
order to identify the real challenges, we must look at the bigger picture, including poor 
planning, bad decisions, and unrealized goals in pension policy. What are needed are 
policy options that enhance and expand existing DB pension coverage. The push for DC 
plans should be rejected because it is not good for workers. The growth of RRSPs leads to 
problems. In addition, public pensions must be renewed since they lessen the burden on   22
workplace pensions. Solid features of public pensions usually include low costs, benefit 
security, and progressive benefit details. There is the need for a new culture of solidarity. 





International perspectives on income security in old age 
 
 
Garry Barrett, Economics, University of New South Wales 
 
Garry Barrett, in a paper co-authored with Yi-Ping Tseng, gave an overview of 
retirement saving in Australia. Australia’s retirement incomes system consists of three 
tiers: means-tested public age pensions, voluntary private savings, and mandated private 
savings. Australia introduced the Age Pension in 1909 primarily as a means to alleviate 
poverty. The program was subject to means-testing right from the onset, but participation 
has increased over time and now covers 77% of the elderly population. Thus, it has become 
the main source of retirement income for the majority of elders. Currently, about two-thirds 
of recipients receive the maximum benefit amount. Funding comes from general tax 
revenues on a pay-as-you-go basis. Voluntary superannuation has long been important for 
only a minority of Australians, particularly public sector workers and high-income earners 
who receive very generous tax concessions. Mandated superannuation was introduced in 
1986 when the government and the labour movement agreed to split the 6% CPI increase 
into a 3% wage increase and a 3% employer contribution to superannuation. In 1992, the 
government introduced the Superannuation Guarantee (SG). At its introduction, the SG 
required an employer contribution of 3%, but its level was scheduled to increase gradually 
to 9% of earnings by 2002. Employers pay their contributions into individual employee 
accounts. The accounts are held in private superannuation funds, and there are no asset 
portfolio or minimum rate of return requirements. Benefits, typically paid on a DC basis, 
are fully vested and portable.  Little is known about the impact of the SG on household or 
national savings. Pension policy reform is currently under consideration. The following 
three issues were seen as important: (1) the integration of various tiers, especially the 
increase of the superannuation preservation age to the Age Pension age, (2) adjusting Age 
Pension rules, such as the treatment of housing in the asset test and linking eligibility age to 
mortality tables, and (3) reforming Superannuation, especially securing its adequacy and 
addressing the governance and regulation of funds.  
 
 
Michael Hurd, Director, RAND Center for the Study of Aging 
 
Michael Hurd, in a paper co-authored with Susann Rohwedder, assessed the 
adequacy of resources in retirement. There are three methods for assessing adequacy: (1) 
the income replacement rate, (2) a comparison of wealth at retirement with earnings over 
lifetime, and (3) an assessment of whether households can sustain consumption (spending) 
during retirement. The first method has many shortcomings, and the second is   23
methodologically difficult. Hurd and Rohwedder used the third method and looked at 
whether resources at retirement can maintain the consumption level or path. The life-cycle 
model is the theoretical background for this method: the individual knows his or her 
lifetime earnings path, chooses a consumption path and a retirement age, has annuities 
(Social Security and pensions), and at retirement continues along the optimal consumption 
path, using annuities and wealth. The method involves three components: (1) an observed 
consumption level at age 65, (2) a theoretically or empirically derived consumption path at 
ages higher than 65, and (3) an assessment of whether the resources are sufficient to 
support this consumption path. Using the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey 
(CAMS), Hurd compared the empirical consumption paths to that derived from their 
model, showing that they were very similar. With data from the Health and Retirement 
Study and simulations, he tried to answer the question of whether the observed economic 
resources shortly following retirement can sustain the estimated consumption path. Hurd 
found that the preparation for retirement was adequate at the population level, but that the 
less educated have under saved on average. Persons with a college education or above have 
over saved on average. Married persons are more often adequately prepared for retirement 
than single persons. Differences in mortality between the poor and the wealthy, and single 
and married persons, do not change the likelihood that a person is adequately prepared. 
 
 
Martin Hering and Michael Kpessa, Political Science, McMaster University 
 
Martin Hering and Michael Kpessa analyzed the prospects of integrating 
occupational pension regulations in Canada through a comparison with recent 
developments in the European Union. In recent years, there have been several attempts to 
integrate occupational pension regulations across jurisdictions. Canada proposed principles 
for a pension model law (2004, 2005), and the European Union enacted a pension fund 
directive (2003) and proposed a portability directive (2005). At the international level, the 
OECD formulated principles for pension regulation and supervision (2004). It is important 
to find out which obstacles make occupational pension integration politically difficult: in 
Canada, the Reciprocal Agreement among the provinces has not been updated or expanded 
since the 1960s, and in the EU, the single market in occupational pensions was blocked for 
more than 10 years. Hering and Kpessa investigated the strategies that could overcome 
existing obstacles and make integration politically feasible. A comparison between Canada 
and the EU is critical since Canada is the only advanced industrialized country in which 
occupational pensions are regulated at the sub-national level, and since attempts at 
integration have been made by the association of provincial pension regulators (CAPSA). 
In addition, the EU has successfully adopted a pension fund directive despite a great 
diversity among occupational pension systems. Hering and Kpessa argued that three 
strategies can make occupational pension integration politically feasible: (1) the problem 
definition needs to focus on the protection of the diversity of occupational pension systems, 
(2) the scope of regulation needs to be limited to financial regulations and exclude social 
regulations, and (3) methods of integration need to be different for financial regulations 
and social regulations. They concluded that CAPSA’s initiative for a pension model law 
will likely not lead to progress in occupational pension integration because it sees diversity   24
among occupational pension systems as a problem, extends the scope of regulation to 








Robert Willis, Economics, University of Michigan; Director, Health and Retirement Study 
 
Robert Willis gave an overview of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and 
presented key findings based on the analysis of HRS data. He focused on their implications 
for retirement behavior and policy options. The HRS is designed to develop data for the 
U.S. to help scientific and policy researchers understand the challenges of population aging 
and design policies to meet them. Similar data is now being collected throughout Europe, 
in Asia and parts of Latin America, but unfortunately not in Canada. Willis argued that 
Canada needs data like these. There are changes in the demographic structure in all 
industrialized countries, the baby boomers are approaching retirement, and there is the 
divorce revolution and changes in family structure. At the same time, there are also 
changes in the landscape of work and retirement: a continued decline in defined benefit 
pensions, solvency issues, an increase in 401(k) and other defined contribution plans, a 
decrease in employer health insurance and disappearing retiree health insurance, and 
increased complexity of decisions about work, savings, health, and retirement. Finally, 
there are changes in epidemiological and health care trends, and changes in policies. The 
changing age structure is a challenge because aged individuals face decreasing health and 
productivity, great uncertainty at the individual level and a diminished capacity to respond 
to shocks at older ages. The social institutions to deal with aging are sensitive to the age 
distribution since intergenerational transfers from young to old people are more costly as 
the population ages. The pressure on intergenerational transfers would be relieved if people 
chose to work longer or if they were forced to work longer. People delay entry into the 
labor force to obtain education and training. Given the extended length of life, it makes 
sense to assume that people may wish to also extend the length of their working life. The 
alternative would be to choose lower levels of consumption at younger and/or older ages. 
Changes in the dependency ratio may be exacerbated or offset by the work and retirement 
decisions of individuals. Increases in the length of individuals’ lives after 65 lead to the 
question of how to finance a longer retirement, or whether it is desirable to spend much of 
one’s life in retirement. In conclusion, Willis pointed out that population aging poses many 
challenges to the U.S. and the rest of the world. Meeting these challenges requires 
advances in understanding of what determines the economic, health, family and 
psychological well-being and behavior of older people. The HRS and its sister studies 
throughout the world are creating a data infrastructure that will enable us to harness the 
scientific creativity of an interdisciplinary and international research community to address 
these challenges. A data infrastructure like this should be created in Canada. 
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SESSION 10 
Major on-going problems: what are the policy options? 
 
 
Ken Georgetti, President, Canadian Labour Congress 
 
  Ken Georgetti argued that DB plans are workers’ best option for a more 
comfortable retirement. When the right policy frameworks are put in place, DB plans can 
assure a predictable and adequate income for families. Individualized pension plans are not 
only risky and costly; they are also inefficient in many ways. 40% of DB plans in Canada 
today are for corporate executives who constitute about 1% of the total workers covered by 
DB plans.  The majority of DB plan holders in Canada are union members, and coverage 
by this form of retirement arrangement remains the key issue for many workers seeking 
union representation. The biggest challenge that DB plans are facing today is the lack of 
foresight in pension planning and the quick resort to a “fend-for-yourself approach”. This 
is illustrated by the federal government’s decision to subsidize the mutual funds industry. 
RRSPs are supported by huge government subsidies, but there are high RRSP fees. DB 
plans are often criticized for excessive costs. But the problem has to do with lack of proper 
planning to pay for these costs in the future. What are needed now are measures to enhance 
the benefit security of existing workplace pensions. Georgetti pointed out that the trade 
unions are not wedded to a single approach, but that their commitment to enhanced benefit 
security is beyond debate. In addition, the labour movement will insist on measures to 
dramatically enhance DB coverage.  
 
 
Jack Selody, Advisor to the Governor, Bank of Canada 
 
Jack Selody proposed a number of measures to strengthen DB plans in Canadian 
companies. Even though studies show that the Canadian pension system does not have a 
problem of low savings, largely avoids poverty in old age, and is politically robust, there 
are still reasons to worry, especially the following two. First, there is a movement from 
collective to individual pensions. This is a problem because not all people have the skills to 
manage their own pension accounts. Consequently, they may become very conservative 
when managing risk, which could lower the efficiency of financial markets. Second, there 
is a move in DB plans to asset-liability matching which leads to greater investment in 
bonds. This is a problem because an efficient economy requires risk-taking. Selody argued 
that we need to give people the mechanisms for taking on risks and managing them. People 
need to have choices. Even though a revolutionary change of the existing system is not 
possible, evolutionary change is. Five measures should be considered: (1) strengthen 
incentives to eliminate deficits by removing the surplus ownership ambiguity and giving 
symmetric access to surpluses for credit worthy sponsors, (2) refine adequacy testing by 
putting less emphasis on solvency tests for credit worthy sponsors, (3) balance accuracy 
and alignment with economic fundamentals in pension accounting, (4) improve member 
awareness of how DB pensions work so that contribution rates can be more responsive, and 
(5) encourage contingent elements in DB pensions and make contingencies explicit (e.g. 
indexation in the Dutch system).   26
William Robson, President and CEO, CD Howe Institute 
 
William Robson argued that the first and second pillars in Canada, OAS and 
QPP/CPP, are in good shape. The risks of DB plans were hidden for a long time, which 
was a problem. One way to address the current funding problems might be to help DB 
plans. Bill 30 in Quebec is a good example. Robson said that the ideas about plan solvency 
discussed at the conference were good. He argued that we need to re-examine the problem 
of creditworthiness of sponsors, and obviously need to have more tax incentives for 
retirement savings for all kinds. The option of pooled money-purchase plans would be a 




Malcolm Hamilton, Worldwide Partner, Mercer Human Resource Consulting 
 
Malcolm Hamilton argued that there are four solitudes in private pensions: DC 
(RRSPs), DB-private, DB-public, and multi-employer plans. The key question that we are 
confronted with is who would be able to give middle income earners good advice on 
retirement savings. Professional advice is only affordable for rich people, and employers 
are not the right vehicle for education. Hamilton stressed that we need to find a way to get 
advice to people. Employers or financial institutions do not have the credentials. We need 
institutions whose interests are aligned with members’ interests. Beginning with a 
discussion of DC plans, Hamilton argued that they need to live up to their potential. For 
example, they should have better default options. Private DB plans are not on the road to 
extinction, but to irrelevance since new industries are not creating DB plans. In mature DB 
plans, risks are very difficult to manage since the risk of sponsoring increases, and the 
organizational ability decreases. One measure that could be taken is to deal with the surplus 
ownership issue. Secure benefits obviously need built-in cushions, but employers face 
uncertainties regarding surpluses. Public sector DB plans face different kinds of problems: 
they are often too generous. For example, employees in correctional services are able to 
retire after 25 years, and the standard of living of retired teachers is double that of 
employed teachers. Thus, the design of these plans is not very rational, and they may not 
serve the interests of members. Size is also an issue. In the Ontario teachers’ plan, a 
fluctuation of 7 billion dollars is equivalent to 70 percent of payroll in any year. Models 
show that the contribution rate would have to fluctuate from 0% to 35% in order to deal 
with these fluctuations. By contrast, the Dutch system has much more viable risk transfer 
model. Finally, multi-employer plans need to decide what their mission is. They look like 
DB plans, but if they are badly funded, benefits can be rolled back, which is not the case in 
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